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INTRODUCTION 
The Canadian intelligence analysis arrangements are currently in trouble. The number of 
analysts in the Canadian Intelligence Community (CIC) is too small to meet the new and 
varied policy needs of the government. The chronic inability of the CIC to coordinate 
analysis activities to ensure optimum production of information and use of personnel has 
reached critical levels. Perhaps, above all, there is an inability not unique to Canada to 
decide on the proper role of intelligence in a world where priorities, relationships, threats 
and power structures keep changing at an accelerating pace. The present arrangements 
are likely to be temporary, and some correctives to be only evolutionary. But, the fact 
remains that the system as it stands is unworkable and hence unstable. Whether or not 
those concerned agree with this diagnosis, let alone the counsel offered, the CIC is 
necessarily in a state of transition that offers both tests and temptations to exploit new 
opportunities. 
 
The primary reason for the current instability is that by establishing a central analysis 
unit, the Community has virtually lost the capacity to do foreign policy or economic 
analysis. Unfortunately, this has been done without gaining either the central authority of 
the British Cabinet Office system to obtain immediate and expert support in any field, 1 
or the "critical mass" of intramural expertise sufficient to stand alone, as does the 
Australian Office of National Assessments. 2  
 
In order to justify these conclusions, this article first deliberately adopts broad definitions 
of "intelligence" and "security." Then, to set the local stage, it offers a few very 
subjective thoughts regarding Canadian attitudes toward both subjects. It then looks at 
some of the major developing trends in this rapidly-changing global society that have 
particular relevance to intelligence analysis. Finally, given this critical and limited 
context, the article describes briefly the Canadian intelligence analysis arrangements as 
they have developed over recent years, outlines the current dilemmas facing the CIC, and 
puts forward some proposals as to how they might be met.  
 
THE NEW MEANING AND FEATURES OF "INTELLIGENCE" AND 
"SECURITY"  
 
Those who argue simply that intelligence is outdated or marginal in the post-Cold War 
world, or alternatively that more is needed because of the increased level and prospect of 
violence, either ignore or misinterpret its new and widening function. This is one 
important result of what Daniel Bell calls the "post-industrial revolution" that now 
dominates change and drives global affairs. Another trend is to rapidly expand the 
essential meaning of security to include many threats other than mass state-to-state 
violence: availability of vital resources, terrorism, natural catastrophes, viruses, mass 
migrations, etc. 3 Meanwhile, sovereign governments are becoming only one level among 
a variety of interdependent power- and decision-centers. 4 Necessarily, this broadens the 
perspective on the nature and role of intelligence in this era.  
 
There is no single official Canadian definition of intelligence. For the purposes of this 
article intelligence is any information or views about "the other side," selected and 
impartially analysed to assist those involved in any policy-making process. The policy 
involved thus can be related to any subject, and is certainly no longer limited to actual or 
potential "enemies." The policy makers need not be governments. The value of any 
intelligence analysis relates to the importance of the policy decision involved, its own 
accuracy and objectivity, and the relevance of "the other side" to the decision.  
 
There is nothing inherently secret about intelligence as defined. Indeed the vast and 
increasing bulk of relevant information is derived from open sources. A fortiori there is 
nothing illegal or secret about intelligence analysis, although some key contents may be 
obtained by surreptitious means because "the other side" does not want to share it. 
Traditionally, most intelligence has related to military or sensitive government matters 
(strategic or tactical) and has been collected in the context of a war or other serious 
conflict of interests between states. This has naturally served to emphasize intelligence's 
identification with state actions, confrontation and deadly competition.  
 
However, the basic characteristics of intelligence have changed in recent years. First, the 
type and variety of information relevant to policy formulation have increased 
enormously, at least partly because the accepted perception of what constitutes security 
threats to modern societies has gradually broadened. 5 Second, the nature and form of 
most intelligence-related information is constantly changing. Its volume and accessibility, 
including from space, have vastly increased, and most is now recorded and transmitted 
electronically. 6 Both developments affect the sources and handling of material relevant 
to intelligence analysts and tend to lower its final classification. This latter is fortunate; 
with the rapidity and interdependence of change in every field, analysis must be available 
faster and more frequently for policy makers to keep up with events. All this is quite 
independent of the political and economic developments that resulted from the end of the 
Cold War. 7  
 
Governments have traditionally been the most dedicated and profligate organizations 
collecting and preparing intelligence because their policy decisions including the waging 
of wars have been the most expensive, and critical to large numbers of people. This also 
may no longer be true; interstate wars are very rare. Governments' unique ability to 
influence, let alone control, world events is increasingly constrained, and yet their forms 
of involvement with "the other side" are proliferating. At the same time, other forms of 
organization manufacturing, financial, advocatory ( Non -governmental Organizations 
NGOs) are increasing in number and power. They have both the resources and 
motivations to engage in intelligence collection and analysis; indeed their survival may 
actually depend upon it. 8  
 
This, then, is the intelligence environment and the challenge faced by the CIC. It is a 
auspicious time to be forced to adapt.  
 
THE CANADIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD INTELLIGENCE  
 
Canada and Canadians appear to have been traditionally less interested in the role or even 
the alleged "adventure" of intelligence than, say, the Americans or British, perhaps 
because it is regularly lumped together with defence and security. This in turn may be 
partly because of the peculiar nature of Canadian history, geography and geopolitics, all 
of which profoundly influence any society's subconscious perception of the world. 9  
 
Geographically whatever may have been said during the Cold War about being 
sandwiched between the two superpowers Canada has been for almost two centuries just 
about the safest country in the world. In practical terms, it can be militarily threatened 
only by the US. Since that state for many decades has been the world's strongest military 
power, and for centuries has vastly outnumbered and out-produced Canada, Canadians 
have also known subconsciously that they are ultimately unable to defend themselves 
against Leviathan. Since the US must defend North America against serious military 
attack by any outside state, a totally defenceless Canada could theoretically entrust its 
entire military security (and hence its national sovereignty) to the Americans.  
 
In the historical sense, too, Canada has always had a sponsor the French, the British and 
then the Americans at precisely the times when the latter two were the strongest powers 
on earth. In that sense, Canadians for good or ill have never been alone. No other major 
country has been in quite the same position of never having had to take its own defence 
seriously.  
 
This does not mean that Canadians have been inclined toward pacifism, even if many 
immigrants came specifically to avoid violence elsewhere. On the contrary, Canada's 
military contribution in both World Wars was extraordinary for a country of its size. But 
these contributions were not offered without serious and strongly felt domestic debate. 
More important, participation was connected to belief, adventure, loyalty or honor, not 
perception of direct threat; all wars were distant. Consequently, for at least a century, war 
for Canadians has been in a certain sense optional.  
 
In spite of the broad definition above, and justifiably in most respects, intelligence has 
traditionally been connected with war and enemies. To the extent that collecting and 
using intelligence is seen as a defensive act undertaken by states to survive in a 
dangerous, anarchical, Realist world, this activity has perhaps also been seen as optional 
for Canada. Canadians have acted and contributed sometimes critically, substantially, and 
not without danger to "our side." The Canadian intelligence product, including from our 
representatives abroad, has been generally good, if limited in scale.  
 
However, it is probably safe to say that for the vast majority of Canadians, intelligence 
has never been subconsciously tied to survival. This was less a matter of morality than of 
priority. The size, resources, role and prestige of the intelligence profession has reflected 
this mind-set in several ways. Except in the SIGINT (signals intelligence) field, Canada 
has not established a secret foreign intelligence service. The profession has never gained 
the popular reputation it achieved in, for example, Britain, which enabled it to attract the 
"best of the best." Finally, those in charge of coordinated national intelligence analysis 
have never achieved the authority to demand participation in preparing analyses as has 
the British Cabinet Office. 10 Nor has it been felt necessary or possible to appoint a single 
intelligence "Czar" with direct access to the head of government and semi -cabinet rank, 
chronically a major issue in the US. 11 In many ways, Canadians' relatively casual mind-
set toward intelligence is no longer appropriate or affordable for any society but 
particularly for one like Canada.  
 
THE GLOBAL CONTEXT AND CHALLENGE  
 
Consciously or unconsciously, intelligence activities all over the world are being forced 
by global trends to confront basically new challenges and opportunities. These are not 
simply the "New World Disorder," although their most outward and visible symptoms 
include ethnic violence, societal disintegration, major local food and migration crises, and 
increased terrorism. Many of the trends have been accelerating for decades, and some 
caused, rather than resulted from, the end of the Cold War. 12 These are simply some of 
the most apparent effects of a global transformation process often identified as the post-
industrial revolution or knowledge society. The process is driven inexorably toward 
constant change mainly by the self-generating power of technology, and it affects willy-
nilly every aspect of every society on earth. In responding to this revolution, Canada may 
have more room for maneuver and error than many countries. But one fact is clear: 
society's need for more accurate and varied information about others' actions, plans and 
capabilities increases exponentially as security threats and interdependence expand 
globally.  
 
Foreign intelligence is in no way optional. Canada has the world's second largest and 
most vulnerable (Arctic) area of ecological responsibility, and the world's longest 
coastline. Canada's harsh climate, combined with the world's highest per capita energy 
consumption, and extraordinary dependence on electric power, makes Canadians 
exceptionally vulnerable to system disruption, terrorism and blackmail. 13 Even among 
rich industrialized countries, Canada's dependence on imported seasonal food and on 
international trade generally is unusually high. The long border is completely 
indefensible against virtually any type of credible security threat from paramilitary to 
parasites. In a political sense, too, Canada may be uniquely vulnerable. Quite apart from 
Quebec's differences with the rest of Canada, the official policies of substantial 
permanent immigration and multiculturalism, whatever their undoubted values, involve 
an already highly diversified country with almost every ethnic issue worldwide.  
 
What are the principal characteristics of the post-industrial or information society that 
particularly affects intelligence analysis? There are numerous books and studies on the 
basic metamorphosis taking place throughout world society. 14 One fact they all seem to 
perceive in common is that the revolution is driven by knowledge, and that knowledge 
now constitutes the most critical form of power. Alvin Toffler argues that there are only 
three basic sources of power: violence, wealth, and knowledge, and that today, 
knowledge has become both dominant, and essential to the others. 15 Harlan Cleveland 
identifies six peculiarities of information: it is expandable; it is not resource-hungry; it is 
substitutable; it is transportable; it is diffusive; and it is shareable. 16 Intelligence is above 
all the careful and purposeful manipulation of available knowledge; its essence and 
possession therefore coincide specifically with success and survival in the revolutionary 
society. Intelligence is about knowledge par excellence; in a sense it is the epitome of 
power management.  
 
Second, post-industrial society is one that is increasingly interdependent. What happens 
anywhere or in any process often has a greater effect upon other events than in the past. 
Partly this simply shows a greater scientific and public awareness of what has always 
been true. This new reality and perception have direct implications for intelligence 
analysis simply because never were the capabilities and intentions of "the other side" so 
evident, numerous, varied, interlocking and consequential. Relevant events can take 
many forms: collapsing or rogue states, 17 mass migrations, 18 pandemics, 19 ecological 
and/or resource crises, 20 terrorism and mass blackmail, 21 financial, corporate or general 
economic breakdowns, possibly caused by technology, 22 weapons and narcotics 
development and proliferation, 23 and ethnic confrontations. 24  
 
Wherever they may take place, no society on earth can now simply insulate itself from 
these events with either money or arms. Indeed, as international trade, financial 
exchanges, transportation and communications, and environmental damage increase 
exponentially, the visible and invisible global links become stronger. Canada's policy 
makers, for reasons already given, must pay particular attention, and intelligence analyses 
must help make the policy decisions the right ones.  
 
Third, intelligence has traditionally been concerned with that security which arises from 
violence or its threat. Violence is indeed likely to increase globally for several reasons. 
While they may take the forms of or be triggered by the events listed above, several 
broad global background trends make violence the end result, with security, policy, and 
thus intelligence, implications. The triggers may include gross economic inequities made 
painfully evident by modern communications; the incomplete or inadequate breakup of 
multi-ethnic and/or autocratic regimes; cultural -religious backlash to Western-identified 
modernism; or sheer physical desperation. Perhaps most ominously, almost all the 90 
million annual increase in world population is being added in those poor and often 
already crowded countries least able to absorb them.  
 
Even under generally improving conditions, there would be billions more potentially and 
legitimately angry, desperate, unhappy, hungry, frustrated and possibly violent people 
alive today than ever before. In practice, the personal experience of much of the world is 
actually one of increased deprivation, both absolutely and relatively. 25 The standard of 
living in many countries has actually been decreasing. 26 The accelerating revolutions in 
mass communications and transportation make billions more aware each year of their 
relative privation and the physical possibility of moving to where the standard of living 
appears incredibly higher. Indeed the mere fact of accelerating change and scale puts 
pressure on almost all institutions and cultural certainties. All this produces rapid shifts in 
power structures and chronic political turmoil. 27  
 
If intelligence analysis is expected to continue to give priority to threats of violence its 
anticipation, prevention and control there will be much more work to be done. This 
applies particularly to a country that for decades has decided that it is in its national 
interests to give priority to worldwide UN peace-making, and is committed to continuing 
this policy. 28  
 
THE CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM  
 
A generally decentralized intelligence community, the CIC, emerged after World War II, 
mainly as a result of the Cold War. Up to that point Canadian intelligence activities were 
so small, ad hoc or subordinate as to be irrelevant here. The first "real" system of 
independent intelligence analysis was a copy of the British system. 29 By 1960, there was 
a Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) meeting weekly, which coordinated (using informal 
drafting groups) jointly approved analyses, without any analytical staff of its own. Hence 
the vast majority of analyses were essentially drafted and distributed (mainly internally) 
by appropriate departments. The largest intelligence analysis elements were found within 
the headquarters of the Departments of National Defence (NDHQ), which has a very 
small professional intelligence service, and External Affairs (now the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and International Trade DFAIT), which simply assigned some of their 
regular foreign service officers to intelligence analysis duties during home postings. 
There was and is no equivalent to either the career research and analysis staff of area 
specialists in the Foreign Office, or to the State Department's Department of Intelligence 
and Research (INR). In other words, External had no area specialists of any sort mainly 
by their own choice, initially no career analysts of any sort, and indeed no "institutional 
memory" of an area to call on at headquarters, unless a country desk officer happened to 
have been posted sometime to his/her area of responsibility.  
 
Canada has a small signals intelligence agency somewhat like the British General 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) or the US National Security Agency (NSA). It 
was first identified as the Communications Branch of the National Research Council 
(CBNRC), but now constitutes the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) within 
DND. 30 It undertakes only minimal analysis. A Joint Intelligence Bureau which, like its 
British equivalent, dealt with economic and some technical intelligence analysis, was 
officially attached to the Defence Research Board and was comprised of career personnel 
(but with very high turnover). Until the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) 
was created in 1984, the Security Service of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
(RCMP), which operated somewhat like the British Security Service (MI5), carried out 
defensive domestic intelligence functions, but like the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) was also part of the national law enforcement system.  
 
Cooperation with the US, UK, Australian and New Zealand intelligence systems was 
close, mainly as a continuation of wartime cooperation. Although the allied system was 
supposed to be mutually beneficial, Canada was a small player as a rule, and may have 
been more useful to the allies for its geography than its intelligence analysis. One reason 
is that Canada has never had an equivalent to the British Secret Intelligence Service 
(MI6) or the US CIA with responsibilities abroad, although the subject has been 
discussed many times.  
 
The end result has been a chronic shortage of specialized, career analysts (except perhaps 
at NDHQ), and a highly decentralized system where each element was inclined to use 
and keep its own raw material and look after the interests of its own department. The 
central coordinating authority had very little power or even priority. The subliminal 
"optional" approach to intelligence mentioned earlier may have contributed to this.  
 
By the 1990s the CIC had changed its structure in several ways over a period of time. The 
Joint Intelligence Bureau had been transferred in almost its entirety to what is now 
DFAIT, although DND maintains a Directorate of Scientific and Technological 
Intelligence, in addition to its main military intelligence analysis capacity in the 
Directorate of Defence Intelligence (DDI). While the function of economic intelligence 
was first maintained as a bureau within External, it was eventually reduced to a single 
division.  
 
In accordance with the recommendations of the McDonald Royal Commission, the 
Security Service was separated in 1984 from the RCMP and became CSIS. It has no 
criminal investigation functions, but carries out significant security intelligence 
investigative and analysis responsibilities for the government as a whole. The JIC had 
been renamed the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC) and assigned a small 
coordinating staff within the Privy Council Office (PCO), but no direct analysis 
responsibility. The PCO itself has a government-wide coordinating role, although its 
authority particularly vis-à-vis the Prime Minister's Office varies over time. Other federal 
departments (Immigration, RCMP, Customs, Solicitor General) have maintained or 
developed some specialized intelligence analysis capacity but rarely contribute to major 
IAC reports.  
 
Recently, a major change in staff and responsibilities took place. For years there had been 
discussion about the need for some sort of central assessment staff, since departmental 
analysts naturally were expected to look after their departmental demands and needs first. 
In addition, as indicated above, no way had been found to give real authority to any 
central coordinating body or individual in the face of long-established departmental 
autonomy and priorities and the coordinating rather than executive role of the PCO. Also, 
quite apart from any perceived need for a change or reduction in the role of intelligence 
with the end of the Cold War, the federal government was running into serious fiscal 
problems and has felt it necessary to reduce almost all departments' funds and authorized 
staff.  
 
In 1993, it was decided that the need for a central assessment capacity, and the further 
reductions being required of DFAIT in both its budget and its personnel, made it 
advisable to effectively transfer its responsibility and capacity for foreign and economic 
intelligence to the PCO. As a result, the latter created an Intelligence Assessments 
Secretariat (IAS) with both coordination and assessment functions, using the extremely 
limited resources transferred from DFAIT. The result of these moves is that Foreign 
Affairs has been left with virtually no intelligence analysis capacity. Simultaneously, 
while the IAS is very much smaller than the former intelligence analysis staff of DFAIT 
(down from about 35 analysts to 13), its responsibilities are considerably broader. These 
include government-wide coordination and analysis, but without any formal DFAIT 
input. Moreover, however willing they may be to help the IAS, DFAIT desk officers are 
not experienced as analysts, often have not previously visited or dealt with their current 
areas of responsibility, and are fully occupied with operational activities. 31  
 
The Assessment Process  
 
In a more positive light, under the current system participating government entities are 
encouraged to share their information and views, both with the IAC and with other 
assessment units. This helps to avoid duplication and overlap, and often provides basic 
material for IAS products that would not be available otherwise. Many of the 
departmental experts on issues of interest to the CIC are brought together in IAS 
Interdepartmental Expert Groups (IEG's), which have the principal responsibility for 
producing finished intelligence. The IEG's can be either ad hoc to meet special 
requirements, or of a standing character to deal with continuing areas of intelligence 
concern.  
 
A real attempt at consensus is made within IEG's, whose output is finally approved at 
either the IAC itself (Senior ADM's and DG's of the CIC, chaired by the Deputy 
Secretary to Cabinet for Security and Intelligence), or at the newly-formed Approvals 
Committee, comprising senior officers of PCO, CSIS, DND and DFAIT, plus the 
department originating the assessment. Dissenting opinions are permitted although 
discouraged.  
 
The Main Products  
 
Currently, the main products of the collective system of the CIC (i.e., the IAC) are first, 
Intelligence Reports (IR's). These run about 2-5 pages in length, mostly the former, with 
maps, charts and annexes as appropriate. They are normally given the full "finished 
intelligence" treatment, with interdepartmental input, coordination at IEG's, and approval 
by the IAC.  
 
Second are Immediate Intelligence Reports (IIR's). These are shorter products, usually 1-
2 pages, intended to capture the essence of an urgent or critical situation, or currently 
"hot" issues from the security or intelligence perspective. They are prepared quickly with 
the involvement of those departments and agencies most centrally concerned with the 
issue and are released on the authority of the Executive Secretary of the IAS, although 
they may be brought forward for discussion at the full IAC.  
 
Third, as required, longer reference documents are prepared for release through the 
relevant IAC process. CSIS and DND analysts and the DFAIT Operations Centre also 
produce a range of products, varying from those of longer term, strategic perspective to 
current intelligence briefs. Again, these are normally provided to the IAS. The degree to 
which they depend on open versus secret sources will vary from report to report. The 
Director of CSIS told the 1994 Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence 
Studies (CASIS) Conference that ". . . intelligence professionals rely on open sources of 
information for up to 80% of the input to their analysis. . .."  
 
Personnel  
 
Analysts both career and temporary come from a wide variety of backgrounds, 
disciplines and government departments, particularly in the IAS. Language knowledge 
and foreign experience are assets in many fields. There is a modest program, limited by 
current resources, of secondments to components of the intelligence community from 
outside departments and agencies, as well as exchanges of personnel within the 
community itself. Strategic analysts in CSIS, for instance, may come from academe or 
other specialized backgrounds on contract. The majority of regular analysts in the IAS, 
CSIS, DND and CSE have post-graduate degrees, as do most DFAIT foreign service 
officers.  
 
Specialist training varies from agency to agency as does professional skills development 
in analysts. CSE recently advertised for university graduates for analysts, noting that 
"graduation in fields such as economics, international business, commerce . . . would be 
an asset." On a short-term basis, the system can also call on expertise elsewhere in 
government, for example at IEG's, and for unclassified publications.  
 
Analysts who have the talent and desire to become managers have done so successfully, 
while outside managers have also been brought in. Managers are responsible mainly for 
giving direction to priorities, analytical standards, client needs and necessary support. 
Analysts are encouraged also to keep in close, direct and regular contact with clients as 
regards their changing policy needs, for current and specialized information, and as 
analyses are developed. Clients also provide expert advice as to optimum dissemination 
of the finished product.  
 
Clients  
 
On the basis of feedback from allies and Canadian clients, the CIC appears to have 
succeeded in providing timely, focused and policy-relevant advice in spite of recent 
turmoil. Client feedback services have recently been strengthened by the establishment of 
a Marketing and Client Liaison Unit in CSIS, while CSE Customer Relations Officers 
(CRO's) have long worked closely with their clients and are constantly aware of their 
perceived needs and of what might be relevant to them.  
 
A client list developed over the years on the basis of knowledge of varied departmental 
requirements is constantly reviewed. To increase the speed of dissemination after 
production, the CIC is now moving to electronic means as technology and security 
permits. This applies to information disseminated both in Canada and abroad, to 
Canadian posts and allies. CSIS has developed a computer-based system which, in 
collaboration with customers, permits the categorization of client requirements, bringing 
these to the attention of collection and analytical components. The system, called 
Intelligence Requirements Management System (IRMS), prepares necessary transmittal 
documents and tracks delivery of intelligence for security and accounting purposes. It 
also collates feedback from clients and is, therefore, a valuable tool in the intelligence 
cycle. IRMS is now available to the IAS and has been examined for possible application 
within the RCMP, DFAIT and by some allies, notably Australia and the US (FBI). The 
system provides for direct delivery to individual clients and permits the provision of 
specific information as well as broader finished intelligence. Every attempt is made to 
apply the lowest level of classification consistent with good security.  
 
EFFECTS OF RECENT CHANGES  
 
It is clear that, largely as a result of the recent major changes in the IAS and DFAIT, the 
CIC currently suffers from three handicaps that will have to be addressed in some 
manner. First is staffing. Any country, even one working closely with others, must 
maintain a minimum critical mass of qualified intelligence analysts because of the 
growing volume and variety of analyses required to ensure sound policy formulation. 
Canada could not now maintain such a minimum critical mass in the IAS, let alone 
DFAIT, even if all the staff available were ideal professional specialists being used in the 
optimum possible way. There is simply too much relevant knowledge to absorb, process, 
analyze and disseminate. Worse, the government's policy of down-sizing the civil service 
and reducing the deficit means that even the best combination of transfers and contracting 
out will leave insufficient capacity to meet minimum needs.  
 
Second is coordination. Even a state with a more than adequate pool of analysts has 
difficulty making optimum use of them. They are rarely located in one organization 
and/or have one source of tasking. Most of them work mainly or wholly to meet the 
needs of one government department (Defence, Foreign Affairs, etc). While this has 
many advantages, it results at best in duplication and/or gaps in analysis. At worst it 
produces competition. The CIC has always suffered from decentralization, and imperfect 
cooperation and information exchange among its various parts. This has meant under-
reporting for the top levels of policy makers and departments particularly technical ones 
that do not have their own analysis capability. Moreover, at the moment, the PCO's 
mandate seems to be both unclear and insufficient. Hence, regardless of the quality and 
adequacy of its intelligence staff, the central coordinating authority is currently 
unsatisfactory.  
 
Third is information. Today, the principal difficulty facing both policy makers and 
intelligence analysts everywhere is information overload. However large an assessment 
staff a given agency may have, it must deal with more and more varied data than it can 
possibly handle. As the world and governments become more complex and 
interdependent, more data become relevant to decision-making. Simultaneously, the 
volume of information available increases at an even faster rate. Hence intelligence 
analysis is increasingly a process of selecting a tiny number of relevant facts out of the 
infinite number available, planning them in context, and drawing them and their 
significance to the attention of the appropriate policy makers, quickly enough so the 
relevancy is not lost. Here again the CIC suffers: it does not have a complete and 
common all-source pool to draw upon, which again makes for duplication, gaps, and 
above all could permit incorrect assessment. More seriously, even the large amount of 
incoming information overloads the few available analysts, and is often received only in 
forms that make it difficult for them to concentrate on policy priorities.  
 
POSSIBLE OVERALL SAVINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS  
 
To respond to the problems identified, there appear to be three general directions that 
might be followed to get the most and best intelligence analyses from the current very 
limited CIC resources. One involves expanding domestic and international cooperation in 
analysis so as to reduce any significant analytical duplications and lacunae to a minimum, 
not simply within the CIC, but in company with other countries and organizations 
whenever interests coincide. Another involves undertaking whatever CIC organizational 
adjustments are necessary to give intelligence a greater and more useful role, and its PCO 
elements in particular greater authority, to ensure that national policy priorities are 
understood and followed, and that the most appropriate personnel and sources are made 
available quickly to provide the relevant analyses. Finally, and again on the assumption 
that analytical personnel and resources will be scarce for some time, it involves 
exploiting electronics to the maximum in order to get the greatest value from all the 
personnel and information that are available.  
 
Greater Intelligence Cooperation  
 
Since any turbulence is destabilizing in an interdependent world, all countries have a 
direct and collective interest in easing or restraining the acceleration of such situations. 32 
Intelligence can be critical to anticipating, understanding, preventing, easing, or ending 
such situations.  
 
To the extent that at least some intelligence is secret, its growing importance presents 
entirely new security problems. Electronic information will always face the challenge of 
hackers and problems of controlling any unwanted distribution and misuse of sensitive 
information. Like arms proliferation, this is a serious, unavoidable, but probably 
containable problem over time. Total security or insecurity are unlikely, even for short 
periods. Over the medium-term, the problem is essentially one of constantly changing 
judgement and balance: do the dangers of release of information into possibly the most 
malevolent hands outweigh the advantages of its availability to those who can make 
"good" use of it?  
 
A background factor is much more relevant to the broader distribution of intelligence. 
The two main characteristics of the post-industrial or information-driven world that now 
dominate and drive global society are the power, volume, growth and ubiquity of all 
types of knowledge, and the growing interdependence of events anywhere on earth. 
Within necessary security limitations, the exchange of many forms of information/ 
intelligence worldwide is therefore increasingly feasible and widely beneficial. In 
contrast, withholding valuable knowledge and analysis from the United Nations may well 
be increasingly self-defeating, since international stability and even Canadian lives may 
depend upon UN bodies, military commanders, and negotiators making the right 
decisions. 33 Much if not most intelligence can safely and constructively be shared with 
many others, sometimes even with "the other side" itself. The question to ask is "why 
shouldn't we share?" rather than "why should we?" The answer and results may be 
surprisingly positive.  
 
Coordinate Better: Possible Institutional Options  
 
Several possible bureaucratic rearrangements could at least partially address the three 
general problems outlined above. First is the transfer of at least the analytic staff from the 
PCO back to DFAIT. The advantages would be that foreign policy-related intelligence 
analysis would to some extent be carried out again, in the same location as the 
consumers, and hopefully in close and constant consultation with them. The 
disadvantages would be that no analysts would be specifically assigned to prepare broad 
general briefing material for central policy planners in the PMO and PCO, central 
coordination and distribution would if anything be further weakened, and the total and 
currently inadequate number of CIC analysts would not be increased or more 
economically used.  
 
Second is to leave the present arrangement as it is for the time being in the hope that it 
will "shake down" and/or evolve into a more effective variation. The advantages of this 
would be that it would be responsive to needs as they become evident and require priority 
reaction. It might also force some creative and inter-related changes in the PCO and 
DFAIT. The disadvantages would be that things might get even worse, possibly even 
encouraging further cuts.  
 
Third is to change the responsibility for the IAC and the IAS from the PCO Deputy 
Secretary to Cabinet for Security and Intelligence to that for Foreign Affairs and Defence. 
The advantage would be that the chairperson of the IAC would have direct responsibility 
for the main content, rather than the process, of intelligence, and consequently also have 
direct and regular contact with senior personnel in the two main consumer departments. 
The disadvantage could be that these two departments would more than ever dominate 
the selection of analyses, without encouraging DFAIT to assign more analytic staff.  
 
A final option would be to give CSIS assessment staff more direct responsibility for 
foreign intelligence analysis and reporting. The advantage is that this would formalize 
what is increasingly becoming the reality without requiring any legislative change. 
Canadian security is already defined broadly and can be influenced by events anywhere 
abroad, 34 while the CSIS mandate is to serve the entire government. The disadvantage 
would be that an organization with no authority for intelligence collection abroad other 
than through its liaison relationships would become the main producer of foreign 
intelligence analyses.  
 
Exploit the Information Super-highway 35  
 
Intelligence assessment has always been a labor-intensive operation. However, the CIC at 
the present time suffers more than anything else from a shortage of analysts. Hence any 
action or aids that can improve analysts' productivity must be given high priority. The 
CIC has already provided PC's for every analyst's desk and begun computing intra- and 
inter-agency communications, and can hold time-saving conference calls. The main 
constraint is not information: INTERNET is available, the Encyclopaedia Britannica is on 
CD-ROM, selections from all the written media and soon all of the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service (FBIS) can be called up. The main constraints might be summarized 
as security, selectivity and synthesis. First is security. Means have been found to provide 
safe communications at various security levels. The immediate problem for an analyst or 
client with room for only one PC screen is to honor the security requirements of different 
types of material. For the PC the problem is to match the top security level of access with 
each user. If this can be solved, and so long as the user provides appropriate 
identification, various security levels of information might be fed in turn through the 
same screen. The analyst could then remain in situ forever!  
 
Second is selectivity. The next problem to be overcome is information overload. An 
analyst or customer does not just want to get a list of all available information on a 
subject through key words or combinations. Such word selection has been possible for 
many years, and is invaluable for avoiding garbage or informing the consumer whether 
material on a certain subject is available. With a virtually unlimited data source available, 
an analyst, client or intelligence "contractor" must be able to be much more specific in 
his/her selection. Database query must therefore continue to be developed in order to 
become more and more selective as the database becomes greater and the time available 
for retrieving relevant material shorter.  
 
The final constraint is synthesis. Ultimately this is asking for a robotized analyst, but 
short of that some progress can be expected. Here the software would not only scan the 
relevant information, select from it, and summarize the selection, but also draw some 
conclusions from the summary. This is already done in other fields of much less security 
importance than, say, tactical intelligence, where possibly minutes or seconds count and 
lives are at stake. The point of all the above, which is not new, is simply a reminder that 
current and foreseeable computer capacities have a direct and particular value for 
intelligence analysis; and a country like Canada, with a particular shortage of analysts, 
may have to be in the forefront of developing and exploiting such capacities.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
No one can deny that the CIC is facing significant problems in attempting to carry out its 
analytical role with the current size, allocation and authority of its resources. However, 
the new and constantly changing importance of intelligence for the Canadian government 
makes it imperative that these problems be solved as soon and cheaply as possible. 
Fortunately, Canada is not alone in this dilemma; many other countries and friendly 
organizations are grappling with the same issues. If the prime characteristic of any good 
intelligence analyst is creative manipulation of knowledge, the CIC's analysts and 
managers will have to be creative in their search for solutions to Canada's intelligence 
assessment problems.  
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